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An end to Nuclear apartheid Tuesday, 09 Sep 2008

The clean waiver given to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) enables India to resuscitate our nuclear energy program without endangering our nuclear deterrent. India will not merely be able to access nuclear fuel supplies to step up generation from its existing power reactors, currently operating at no more than 30-50 per cent capacity, but also free it from sanctions and denial of nuclear commerce that have debilitated its nuclear and more general technological progress for several decades.

The NSG document while taking note of the energy needs of India and of the steps that India has voluntarily taken in deciding to separate civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and in filing a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with IAEA and agreeing to application of safeguards to its civilian nuclear facilities and to refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; has agreed that participating governments may transfer "trigger list items" and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguarded facilities and participating government may also transfer nuclear related dual use equipment, materials, software and related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities.

Both the US presidential nominees on Sunday have welcomed the NSG waiver to India, with Republican John McCain asking Congressional leaders to act "expeditiously" to pass the Indo-US nuclear deal and Democrat Barack Obama seeking its quick submission before lawmakers. Despite the fact that this is a huge breakthrough for India some critics continue to cry foul. The BJP calls the waiver a "non-proliferation trap" set by the US and other countries. It argues that by taking away India's right to test ever again, the NSG was continuing to punish India as it had done in 1974. It questions whether India's right to test become "illusionary" or can India undertake further tests, what are the benefits that can accrue to India.will India be able to receive technology for enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) , sensitive and dual use technology and whether India be able to maintain "lifetime reserves" of fuel etc Others have argued that the UPA Government has "converted its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing into a multi-lateral commitment". It will bind India to all the conditions set out in the Hyde Act. India would not get any better terms from any other country supplying nuclear fuel or reactors as all of them would now align with the 123 Agreement.

The principal criticisms of the agreement are that India will lose its rights to further nuclear tests and our foreign policy will be constrained due to the provisions of the Hyde Act. Both these criticisms are without basis. Neither the 123 Agreement nor the NSG Waiver explicitly refers to nuclear tests. The important point to note is that it was the NDA Government which had announced the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and the present Government is merely continuing that policy. A clear separation plan for our civil and military nuclear facilities has also been agreed to. Secondly the extraneous and prescriptive provisos of the Hyde Act are not binding on India which would only be bound by the international treaty it has signed viz the 123 agreement. India has also been allowed to build strategic reserves of fuel for its civil nuclear reactors up to their life cycles and to reprocess spent fuel.

It is useful to recollect that our former President and also the architect of Pokharan II, Dr. Abdul Kalam is a strong supporter of the agreement. Former president A P J Abdul Kalam has said the India-US nuclear agreement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver were good for the country and also that India may break its "voluntary moratorium" on further nuclear tests in "supreme national interest". Kalam made it clear that if the need arose, "India will do the test in the supreme national interest and nobody can stop it", and stressed that when it comes to national interest all political parties must come together. "Well, you see, supreme national interest, OK, every country got supreme national interest, any pact or any treaty; when the national interest comes in, it becomes the highest priority," Kalam said in an interview. In any case the 123 agreement recognizes India's implicit right to test should the geopolitical situation so warrant.

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) through its waiver has lifted obstacles to India buying products and technologies associated with civilian uses of nuclear technology from (and selling these to) most significant nuclear powers save the US. To enable civil nuclear commerce with the US, that country's legislature must now ratify the 123 Agreement finalised between the Bush administration and New Delhi.

The implications are not just for nuclear energy, with our existing reactors that are running short of fuel now potentially able to run at full capacity and enable us to set up new nuclear plants. The unprecedented decision of the NSG giving exemption to India which has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should also be recognized as India's coming of age in the world order.

Vital sectors of the economy stand to benefit from access to a range of high-technology products and technologies that had, till now, been outside India's reach because of its status as a nuclear pariah. Many advances in materials, communications, computing, signaling, chemical processing and avionics are deemed sensitive technologies not accessible to nuclear have-nots. Access to these technologies opens up now. This will improve efficiencies across the board in India, from weather forecasting to oil refining.

The country can now attract over $40 billion in foreign investment in 18-20 nuclear plants over the next 10-15 years as the result of private sector entry into India's nuclear power generation. As Rajiv Gandhi once said, "India missed the industrial revolution; I don't want it to miss the electronic revolution". But without an energy boom even our electronics and IT sectors cannot sustain their growth levels. India at present has per capita power consumption of just 480 kwh against 1782 kwh for China and 7111 kwh for an advanced European country like Germany. India consumes 3.2 % of world's power against China's 14% and the USA's 24.2%. At present nuclear power production in India accounts for only a measly 3% of the total generation of 140,000 MW. Large scale nuclear power production would also mean less dependence on traditional sources of non-renewable fuel such as coal, oil and petroleum. We need new energy sources to sustain our growth prospects. Now after nearly three decades India has been offered a golden opportunity to emerge out of its nuclear seclusion and be at par with the top nations of the world in terms of nuclear energy output.

But the biggest gain is strategic. Non-proliferation activists objected to what they called India's "win-win deal" on the ground that it gives India an exceptional status: It is the only country that possesses nuclear bombs but is not part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be accepted into the community of nations allowed to legitimately engage in nuclear commerce. The major powers of the world have recognized India's status as a growing power whose potential to contribute to a stable global order is huge. It is that recognition that persuaded them to work out the current exception to nuclear convention in the form of the waiver from NSG. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Chairperson UPA, Smt. Sonia Gandhi our External Affairs Minister, Shri Pranab Kumar Mukherjee and the entire ruling UPA as well as our diplomats and nuclear scientists should get the credit for having made this global breakthrough.

Annexures

PART-I

  • The Hyde Act constitutes internal US legislation that enables the US Government to negotiate an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with India.
  • The 123 Agreement, which has been negotiated between India and the US constitutes the enabling framework that will guide India-US civil nuclear cooperation. This agreement lays down the broad parameters for such cooperation. It will be ratified by the US Congress only after the conclusion of an India-Specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA and the adoption by the NSG of an exemption in favour of India.
  • Actual nuclear trade between India and the US will be conducted on the basis of the existing trade laws, rules and procedures of both India and the US. As is the practice, when actual trade and cooperation starts, the partner countries facilitate the harmonization of their respective rules and procedures governing such trade. This may require India and the US to further amend some of their own laws, rules and procedures governing such trade. This will be done at the appropriate time.

PART-II

  • In order to enable cooperation with the wider international community, the conclusion of an India-Specific Safeguards Agreement and an exemption by the NSG from its guidelines in favour of India are essential.
  • The Safeguards Agreement has been concluded and was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 1 August, 2008. The process of NSG exemption has now been achieved. Taken together, these two elements constitute a passport for India to explore nuclear trade with the wider international community.

PART-III

  • Once all these pieces are in place, India would be ready to consider nuclear trade with the wider international community, including Russia, USA and France on the basis of the already negotiated bilateral agreements with these countries, which are awaiting ratification/signatures. Actual trade will take place according to the existing trade laws, rules and regulations of the two countries.
  • How to cooperate, with which country to cooperate and to what extent such cooperation will go - all these are matters of sovereign decision by India that will be made keeping national interest and other relative aspects in view.

PART-IV

  • The US Congress sets rules for international trade in the US. As such, it is natural for it to engage in a dialogue with the US Administration as it goes about the process of amending and/or enacting laws/ regulations/procedures governing such trade, including nuclear trade.
  • It is a matter of public knowledge that the US Congress poses questions for the record to the Administration about legislative matters and receives answers to them. The questions and answers that have been exchanged between the US Congress and the US Administration with regard to the 123 Agreement represent this process and there is nothing out of the ordinary about them. They reflect the fact that Congress is trying to seek clarifications on an urgent matter that is about to go before it. India's Parliamentary Committees undertake much the same line of enquiry whenever important matters of legislation are before them.
  • It should be noted that these questions were posed in October 2007 and answers to them were provided in January 2008. Clearly, after the 123 Agreement was concluded between India and the US on 1 August 2007, parallel processes of enquiry, consultation and clarifications started both in United States and in India. Just as the Government of India undertook a process of informing Parliament about these developments and consulting with its allies, the US Congress started a parallel process of seeking clarifications from the Administration by way of posing these questions. These actions were also relevant because both sides anticipated the next steps in the process, i.e., the conclusion of an India-Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the adoption of an exemption to its guidelines by the NSG in favour of India.
  • Insofar as the substance of these questions and answers is concerned, Government of India does not, as a matter of policy, comment on internal correspondence between different branches of another government. We are clear that cooperation between India and the US will be guided by the India-US 123 Agreement, which is based on the India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 and the Separation Plan of March 2, 2006.
  • Insofar as the issue of the testing is concerned, India's position is well known. We have a unilateral moratorium on testing and this is reflected in the Indian-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005. There is nothing in any document that we have negotiated that limits India's rights with regard to a possible future nuclear test. As far as the consequences of such an action in terms of reactions by other countries are concerned, they have been a matter of public knowledge for quite some time. The 123 Agreement has been concluded in full knowledge of these possible consequences. It should be noted that the consequences would come about even in the absence of a 123 Agreement.
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